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INTRODUCTION  
 
  A  merger  clause,  also  known  as  an  entire  agreement  clause  or 
integration  clause,  is  a  provision  in  a  written  contract  stating  that  the 
contract represents the parties' complete and final agreement. Typically it 
uses the following wording: ‘This Agreement represents the Parties’ entire 
understanding regarding the subject matter herein’ or ‘The contract contains 
the  entire  contract  and  understanding  between  the  parties  hereto  and 
supersedes  all  prior  negotiations,  representations,  undertakings  and 
agreements on any subject matter of the contract’1. This paper is concerned 
with merger clauses having the above or an equivalent formulation. More 
specific merger clauses, sometimes referred to as acknowledgements of non-
reliance2, remain outside the scope of the paper.     
  While originating from the common law system, merger clauses are 
commonly used within the context of international contracts 3. Moreover, 
their  insertion into purely domestic contracts governed by the civil law 
appears to be on the increase. As a result, merger clauses are to be found in 
both cross-border and domestic contracts, irrespective of whether they are 
subject to civil or to common law. This phenome non pertains not only to 
merger  clauses,  but  also  to  other  contractual  provisions  from  Anglo -
American jurisdictions. It is widely recognised that contract drafters all over 
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1 See inter alia Marcel Fontaine and Filip de Ly, Drafting International Contracts (BRILL 
2009) 130; Giuditta Cordero-Moss, ‘Does the use of common law contract models give 
rise to a tacit choice of law or to a harmonised, transnational interpretation?’ in Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss (ed), Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the 
Applicable Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 49; Henrik W. Bjørnstad, 'Entire 
agreement  clauses' 
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Europe are generally inclined to use Anglo-American contract models4. A 
characteristic feature of the Anglo-American contract drafting model is the 
constant presence of so -called boilerplate clauses, of which  the  merger 
clause  is  an  example.  Boilerplate  clauses  are  standardised  contractual 
provisions appearing at the beginning or towards   the end of contracts, 
usually under the heading of ‘miscellaneous provisions’5. Undoubtedly, one 
of the reasons for the spread of the Anglo-American contract model is the 
status of the English language in contemporary business relations. In a large 
percentage of cases, drafting contracts in English is not limited to the usage 
of the language itself, but also entails the application of contract models that 
have been developed in common law jurisdictions. This is mostly because 
separation  of  the  use  of  the  English  language  from  the  adoption  of 
contractual structures used in English-speaking countries is very difficult. It 
would demand not only a deep knowledge of the common law system, but 
also  a  systematic  juxtaposition  between  this  legal  system  and  the  law 
governing  the  contract  followed  by  revision  of  the  contract,  so  that  it 
becomes adequate for the governing law6. Since an average contract drafter 
usually lacks such knowledge, many common law boilerplate clauses  have 
spread in civil law countries more by custom than for the fulfilment of real 
needs. Very often they are simply copied from widely -available English 
language contract templates and samples. Apart from spontaneous spreading 
of boilerplate provisions there are ,  however, numerous instances of thei r 
purposive and sensible usage. In the case of merger clauses, the rationale 
behind their usage is that they  help to minimise the risk  of contracting by 
rendering the contract a self-sufficient source of the parties' obligations and 
rights.  It is generall y  held  that  the use of merger clauses leads to the 
separation of the contract document from the precedent informal promises 
and agreements between the parties to a contract. Supposedly this is the 
effect that the parties intend to achieve by using merger clauses. Whether it 
is possible to reach this goal is , however, a completely different question. 
Not surprisingly, responses to it may differ significantly, depending on the 
law governing the contract. This paper examines the legal effects of merger 
clauses under Polish law. It does not cover the effects of merger clauses in 
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aimed at analysing the legal effects of contract models from common law systems when 
they  are  used  in  contracts  governed  by  the  civil  law  jurisdictions 
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angielskie  i  polskie  wzorce  tekstowe’ 
<http://www.translegis.com.pl/ll_archiwum/LL_1_2.pdf>, accessed 20.02 2013.  
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the common law system. This subject has been discussed elsewhere from 
the perspective of a civil law specialist7.  
  It is worth stressing that the need for uniformity of private law at the 
European Union level  has led to the design of model rules on merger 
clauses.  One  such  rule  is  contained   in  Art.  72  of  the  Proposal  for  a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law (CESL), which  follows the path of its predecessors: 
Art. 2-105 of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and Art. II. - 
4-104 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Although the 
CESL rule differs considerably from  what was provided in PECL and 
DCFR, the idea of regulating the legal effects of merger clauses has always 
been present in the course of formulating model European private law rules. 
This is not the case in Poland, nor in many other Member States' domestic 
regimes. Nonetheless, it seems that as far as Polish l aw is concerned, the 
effects of merger clauses  are not likely to be  significantly different from 
those set out in the European private law model rules. Whether this is in fact 
the case  cannot be established at this point, since the answer requires a 
detailed investigation on the effects of merger clauses in Polish law. More 
will be said in the conclusion of this paper. Before entering into an analysis 
of merger clauses under Polish law, some theoretical and methodological 
remarks are appropriate.   
 
 
I. METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
  Whatever the reason for their application, the fact is that Polish legal 
practitioners are often confronted with merger clauses in their day-to-day 
practice.  Having  encountered  them  in  a  contract,  the  lawyer  needs  to 
establish what function, if any, they have. In other words, he or she needs to 
determine the legal effects of the merger clause. Since the Polish Civil Code 
does  not  provide  any  regulation  concerning  merger  clauses,  their  legal 
effects are to be ascertained in the light of general provisions on juridical 
acts.  For  this  to  be  accomplished  two  theoretically  separate  stages  of 
reasoning  are  required.  First,  interpretation  of  the  merger  clause  that 
appeared in the contract. Second, assessment of the validity of such a clause. 
As emphasized above, the main purpose of the inclusion of merger clauses 
is to render the document the sole, self-sufficient source of the parties' rights 
and obligations. Read in this way, merger clauses are thought to exclude any 
additional sources which could complement the contract, be it their own 
statements  and  agreements  preceding  the  moment  of  the  signing  or  the 
contractual  terms  which  may  by  implied  pursuant  to  the  statutory  law8. 
Thus, in Polish law the interpretation of merger c lauses suggests that they 
influence the process of interpreting contracts9, the process of determining 
                                                 
7 Michał Romanowski, ‘Skutki zastrzeżenia w umowie merger clause’ (2011) 12 Przegląd 
Prawa Handlowego 6-7;  Bjørnstad (n 1) 6-15.  
8  See  Radosław  Strugała,  Standardowe  klauzule  umowne:  adaptacyjne,  salwatoryjne, 
merger, interpretacyjne oraz pactum de forma (C.H. Beck 2013) 248 – 151.  
9 Marcin Łolik, ‘Charakter prawny klauzul integralności umowy w prawie polskim’ (2007) 
8 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 54-58; Dorota Krekora-Zając, ‘Klauzule integralności 
jako  sposób  regulacji  stosunków  między  stronami  i  wykładni  postanowień  umowy’ 
(2008) 2 Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy 78; Andrzej Szlęzak, ‘Polemicznie o skutkach 
zastrzegania  tzw.  merger  clause’  (2013)  2  Przegląd  Prawa  Handlowego  31;  
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their terms with respect to the parties’ agreements prior to the signing of the 
contract document10 or so-called pre-contractual statements11, as well as the 
process of filling in gaps when the contract is deemed incomplete. These 
effects will be analysed   further in this paper,  in  the order  given  above. 
However, it has been observed that the legal effects of merger clauses may 
appear different depending on w hether the clauses were inserted into the 
contract itself (contract document) or into the standard terms of contract. 
Thus,  analysing  merger  clauses  in  the standard  terms  of  contract  may 
require some additional assumptions, and therefore will not be covered in 
sections  II to V of this paper.  Analysis  in those sections  will only be 
undertaken  with  respect  to  merger  clauses  inserted  into  the  contract 
document. Some remarks on merger clauses inserted into the standard terms 
of contract will be made in the conclusion of the paper (section VI).   
  Many problems that arise while dealing with the legal effects of 
merger  clauses  seem  rooted  in  the  ambiguity  of  some  essential  legal 
concepts, among which the notion of contract is of great importance. That is 
why insight into the very nature of  the contract can help overcome at least 
some  of  the  problems  just  mentioned.  According  to  the  traditional 
definition, held by most Polish civil law scholars12, the contract is a juridical 
act which consists of at least two declarations of will aimed at establishing, 
modifying  or  terminating  a  legal  relationship.  A  legal  relationship  is 
understood as the rights and obligations enjoyed by subjects  of civil law. 
Having said this, it may easily be observed that contracts and other juridical 
acts are thought to create rights or obligations. This leads Polish scholars to 
the conclusion that declarations of will express norms 13. As such, they are 
commands addressed to an individual, by which defined conduct is imposed 
on him14. It is important that declarations of will usually appear as indirect 
                                                                                                                            
Romanowski (n 7) 7-10.      
10 Romanowski (n 7) 11; Krekora-Zając (n 9) 78-80; Łolik (n 9) 53-58.   
11 Fryderyk Zoll, ‘Uwagi do art. 92 Projektu – tzw. merger clause’ (2010) 4 Transformacje 
Prawa Prywatnego 62.  
12 Zbigniew Radwański, ‘Teoria umów’ (PWN 1977) 62; Piotr Machnikowski, Swoboda 
umów  według  art.  3531  KC.  Konstrukcja  prawna  (C.H.  Beck  2005)  125;  Witold 
Czachórski,  Adam  Brzozowski,  Marek  Safjan,  Elżbieta  Skowrońska-Bocian, 
Zobowiązania.  Zarys  wykładu  (Lexis  Nexis  2009)  118;  Stefan  Grzybowski,  Prawo 
cywilne.  Zarys  części  ogólnej  (PWN  1974)  201;  Mieczysław  Piekarski  in  Zbigniew 
Resich,  Jerzy  Ignatowicz,  Janusz  Pietrzykowski,  Józef  Ignacy  Bielski  (eds)  Kodeks 
cywilny. Komentarz, Tom 1 (Wydawnictwo Prawnicze 1972) 150; Michał Niedośpiał, 
‘Swoboda czynności prawnych’ (STO 2004) 33; Michał Niedośpiał, ‘Autonomia woli w 
części ogólnej prawa cywilnego’ (1984) 12 Państwo i Prawo 64.  
13  Machnikowski  (n 12)  129;  Piotr  Machnikowski  in  Edward  Gniewek  (ed),  ‘Kodeks 
cywilny. Komentarz’ (C.H. Beck 2011) 147; Zbigniew Radwański, ‘Zagadnienia ogólne 
czynności prawnych’ in Zbigniew Radwański (ed) System prawa prywatnego. Tom 2. 
Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, (C.H. Beck 2002) 18.     
14 Zygmunt Ziembiński, ‘Kompetencja i norma kompetencyjna’ (1969) 4 Ruch Prawniczy 
Ekonomiczny  i  Socjologiczny  23;  Maciej  Zieliński,  ‘Interpretacja  jako  proces 
dekodowania  tekstu  prawnego’  (1972)  16;  Maciej  Zieliński,  Zygmunt  Ziembiński, 
Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie (PWN 1988) 57-59; Zygmunt 
Ziembiński, Maciej Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania (Biblioteka Myśli 
Semiotycznej 1992) 22-32; Zygmunt Ziembiński, Logika praktyczna (PWN 1999) 106-
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commands15, i.e. those whose traditional grammatical classification is not an 
imperative16.  
  Undoubtedly, the meaning presented above constitutes the essence of 
the contract. However, the notion of con tract is ambiguous. Depending on 
the context, it may also convey different meanings. For the purpose of 
further findings, it is vital to emphasize that the term ‘contract’ is often used 
to  denote  the  document  which  embodies  a  contract  in  the  sense  of  an 
agreement17. From this perspective, the term  ‘contract’  is  equivalent  to 
‘text’, that is all the expressions contained in it, as opposed to the strict 
meaning of the contract (contract in the agreement sense) which covers only 
those parts of the text that can be considered to express norms (declarations 
of will). Now it is clear that contract in the document sense is a broader 
concept, as is ‘contractual clause’ or ‘contractual term’ used in this context, 
for it does not necessarily mean an utterance of a prescriptive nature (an 
utterance which expresses norms). Having made this observation, we may 
draw  a  distinction  between  normative  and  non-normative  contractual 
clauses,  the  latter  being  information  about  facts.  For  an  expression 
contained in a contract (document) to be deemed normative (prescriptive), it 
is not only necessary that the parties intend to bring about the legal effects 
that it expresses, but it is also vital that the parties are empowered to do so. 
Whether they are or not is a question of the scope of freedom of contract. A 
contractual clause aimed at bringing about legal effects exceeding the scope 
of freedom of contract either tends to be void itself (partial invalidity) or 
leads to the invalidity of the whole contract (see Art. 58 (3) of the Polish 
Civil Code). It is crucial to note that in statutory law it is very probable that 
a non-normative clause has some legal meaning. It can be often treated as 
evidence of the facts relevant to a dispute concerning the contract that this 
clause is a part of. It follows from this that even if a contractual clause turns 
out to be ineffective, it may still serve as proof of some facts. Among these 
facts, some psychological states - for instance, the parties’ intentions - may 
be of importance.   
  At  the  conclusion  of  these  introductory  remarks,  it  is  worth 
mentioning  that  the  word  ‘contract’  is  also  used  to  indicate  a  legal 
relationship resulting from a contract in its primary sense18. This meaning 
will also be used later on in this paper, when by saying that  a contract may 
be freely modified by the parties we will in fact mean the modification of 
the legal  relationship. This  will  also  be  the  case  when  pre -contractual 
clauses that become part of the contract are analysed.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  See  Maciej  Zieliński,  Interpretacja  jako  proces  dekodowania  tekstu  prawnego 
(Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu 1972) 46; 
Radwański, ‘Zagadnienia ogólne czynności prawnych’ (n 13) 18; Ziembiński, Zieliński 
(n 14) 69.    
16 Melvin Joseph Adler, A Pragmatic Logic for Commands (John Benjamins Publishing 
1980) 2.  
17  Karolina  Włodarska-Dziurzyńska,  Sankcje  w  prawie  konsumenckim  na  przykładzie 
wybranych umów (Lexis Nexis 2009) 69-82.  
18 Machnikowski (n 12) 152.    
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II. MERGER CLAUSES AND INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT   
 
  As  far  as  the  influence  of  merger  clauses  on  interpretation  is 
concerned, we should begin with some insight into Polish legal provisions 
governing  contract  interpretation.  The  concept  of  interpretation  of 
contracts19 under Polish civil law is spelled out in Art. 65 of the Polish Civil 
Code. It contains two methods of interpretation: subjective and objective, 
which together comprise the so-called combined theory of interpretation 20. 
As such, the provision  under discussion is in harmony  with the majority 
European Union  Member  States’  legal  regimes,  which  also  combine  the 
subjective and objective methods21.  
  In Polish law, as in the majority of legal orders, priority is given to 
the  subjective  method 22.  This  means  that  the  interpreter  (the  court  or 
arbitrator) should start the process of interpretation by trying to ascertain the 
parties' common intention at the time the contract was concluded. A contract 
is supposed to reflect the parties' will. Therefore, if there is a conflict 
between the parties' common intention and the literal meaning of contractual 
provisions,  the  former  should  prevail.  It  is  worth  emphasizing  that 
subjective interpretation is not limited to instances in which the parties agree 
as to the meaning of the contract 23. Hence, the subjective method can be 
applied even if the parties  are in dispute as to the meaning of the contract, 
claiming to have understood its terms differently. When they do so,  the 
question arises of how the parties' common intention is to be determined. 
According to the  generally  accepted understanding of  legal  scholars, the 
common intention should be ascertained by looking at how the parties acted 
during  the  negotiations  and  at  (after)  the  moment  of  the  contract’s 
conclusion. Examples of factors relevant to interpretation often cited in legal 
literature include statements made by the parties to each other and to others 
in which the parties reveal how they understood the contract provisions, as 
well as the manner in which the contract is performed24.    
  If the interpreter fails to establish the common intention of the 
parties  (especially  when  there  is  no  evidence  available),  the  objective 
method  of  interpretation  should  be  employed 25.  At  this  stage  of 
interpretation the contract should be given the meaning tha t a reasonable 
                                                 
19  It  needs  to  be  underlined,  however,  that  the  range  of  appliacion  of  the  provision  in 
question is wider; it regards not only contracts, but all the juridical acts (also unilateral).  
20 Zbigniew Radwański, Wykładnia oświadczeń woli składanych indywidualnym adresatom 
(Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich 1992) 60; Andrzej Janiak in Andrzej Kidyba (ed), 
'Kodeks Cywilny. Komentarz. Tom I. Część Ogólna', (Wolters Kluwer business 2009) 
388; Jarosław Grykiel in Jarosław Grykiel, Marcin Lemkowski (eds) Czynności prawne. 
Art. 56-81 KC (C.H. Beck 2010) 176; Machnikowski (n 13) 161. 
21 See Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), The Principles Of European Contract Law, Parts I 
and II (Kluwer Law International 2000) 288 – 291; Christian von Bar and  Eric Clive 
(eds),  Principles,  Definitions  and  Model  Rules  of  European  Private  Law:  Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Full edition (Sellier, European Law Publishers 
2009)  553-560;  Ewa  Rott-Pietrzyk,  ‘Interpretacja  oświadczeń  woli  (Uwagi  na  tle 
rozwiązań księgi I Kodeksu cywilnego)’ (2010) 4 Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 47.  
22 Rott-Pietrzyk (n 21) 47-48.  
23 Radwański (n 20) 81; Machnikowski (n 13) 163; Grykiel (n 20) 179.  
24 See Radwański (n 20) 81.  
25 Grykiel (n 20) 179; Machnikowski (n 13) 162.   2013]  MERGER CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY 
POLISH LAW 
20 
 
person  would  attribute  to  it  when  placed  in  circumstances  equivalent  to 
those that the parties to a contract were in when the contract was formed26. 
This  means  that  while  determining  the  meaning  of  the  contract,  all 
circumstances surrounding  its conclusion and all background information 
(the  entire  context)  available to  and perceivable by a reasonable person 
should  be  taken  into  account.  The  result  of  objective  interpretation  is 
primarily a strict reading, i.e. the normal (plain) meaning of the expressions 
used in the contract. The understanding ascribed to the contract within the 
framework of objective interpretation might nevertheless deviate from the 
regular meaning of the words used in it.  This  would be the case if , for 
example, one party intended an expression used in the contract to have a 
particular meaning and the other party could be expected to have been aware 
of that intention at the time of the contract’s conclusion27. The contract is to 
be interpreted in this way  when there is evidence available indicating how 
the first party understood the contract and how the second party should have 
understood it; this is usually extrinsic evidence.  
  It is the almost unanimous opinion of Polish civil law scholars that 
the rules on interpretation spelled out in Art. 65 are mandatory and cannot 
be derogated by the parties. This leads some of them to the conclusion that 
merger clauses are void as they aim to modify mandatory rules 28. They 
claim that,  consequently,  merger clauses cannot influence the pr ocess of 
interpretation. Their presence in  a  contract does not render the contract 
document the sole object of interpretation. The contract may still be imputed 
a meaning different from what is stated in the document,  for despite the 
insertion of the merger clauses, the interpreter is entitled to resort to  any 
available external evidence justifying a  particular meaning of the contract 
that may not be consistent with the document29.   
  That the provisions of the law concerning interpretation are not to be 
overruled by  a contract is beyond doubt. However,  this does not exclude 
merger clauses' bearing on the process of interpretation.  Merger clauses, 
although ineffective as prescriptive provisions, may still play an important 
role as non-normative ones. In other words, merger clauses can be deemed 
an indicator of the parties' intention to limit the scope of their obligations 
and rights to what can be read in the document (without consulting  external 
evidence)30. However, it should be stressed that merger clauses interpreted 
in this way never exclude the possibility to  demonstrate  otherwise. The 
parties are free to state that  a merger clause does not reflect their real will. 
This can be proven by delivering  additional  documentary evidence that 
supports the parties'  allegations that one or more of them understood the 
contract in the light of statements made orally but not embodied in the 
contract document. Thus, the opinion of some scholars  as presented above 
can be summarised in the following conclusion: merger clauses are evidence 
of the parties' intention to understand the contract  as composed within the 
                                                 
26 Janiak (n 20) 389; Grykiel (n 20) 177.  
27 Radwański (n 20) 95.   
28 Łolik (n 9) 55; Romanowski (n 7) 10.  
29  Łolik  (n  9)  56;  Romanowski  (n  7)  9-10;  See  also  M.  Łolik  Współczesne  prawo 
kontraktów – wybrane zagadnienia (C.H. Becek 2014) 66-70.    
30 See Krekora-Zając (n 9) 78; Szlęzak (n 9) 31-33; Marlena Pecyna Merger clause jako 
zastrzeżenie  wyłączności  dokumentu,  klauzula  integralności  umowy,  reguła  wykładni 
umowy (Wolters Kluwer 2013) 243.     
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four corners of the document, and as such they should be taken into account 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In my opinion, the consequences 
of using merger clauses in contracts are more far-reaching than that31. Even 
where there is no common intention to understand  a contract only in line 
with the contract document, a merger clause should preclude the interpreter 
from ascribing  to  it a meaning consistent w ith  external  circumstances. I 
share the opinion that merger clauses inserted into  a contract should rather 
be  viewed  as  a  means  of  interpretation  (circumstances  relevant  for 
interpretation), and not as regulating the process of interpretation. However, 
I am convinced that merger clauses as such are not only to be used  during 
the process of subjective interpretation, but that they also have a bearing on 
what is called objective interpretation. A reasonable person confronted with 
a  clause  labelling  the  contract  document  an  ‘entire  contract  and 
understanding  between  the  parties’  should  seek  such  a  meaning  of  the 
contract  as  can be inferred from its mere reading  rather than a meaning 
determined with reference to external circumstances32. The presence of a 
merger  clause  leaves  room  for  external  interpretation  only  where  the 
expressions  of  the  contract  are  completely  incomprehensible  without 
resorting to external evidence.  
 
 
III. MERGER CLAUSES VERSUS PRIOR AGREEMENTS 
 
  As  mentioned  above,  merger  clauses  purport  to  preclude  binding 
force of statements made by the parties and their undertakings prior to the 
signing of the contract document. The parties expect that when a contract 
contains a merger clause, all the agreements concluded before the contract 
was signed, be they oral or implied (made per facta concludentia), may not 
be held as a part of it. In the Polish legal literature this effect of merger 
clauses  has  rarely  been  the  subject  of  consideration.  Nonetheless,  it  is 
argued that merger clauses cannot have the effect in question. The purported 
reason is that the Polish Civil Code does not provide a rule analogous to Art. 
2:105 PECL or Art. II - 4:104 DCFR33. As a consequence, merger clauses 
are said to raise a presumption that the contract document is complete, 
which may, however, be rebutted by any kind of proof34. This argumentation 
seems fallacious. In my opinion, in a vast majority of cases agreements 
made before  a  written contract was signed are in fact deprived of  their 
binding effect upon the parties if the  written contract  they have signed 
contains a merger clause. As a starting point for explaining this view some 
general remarks must be made. Under the fundamental principle of freedom 
of contract, the parties are free to modify their contract at any time an d in 
any way they see fit. Apart from the requirements that must be  fulfilled by 
any agreement to be binding, there are no special formalities prescribed for 
an agreement to modify a contract. In particular, it is not necessary for it to 
                                                 
31 Strugała (n 8) 265–266.  
32  See  Przemysław  Gorzko,  Mirosław  Gumularz,  ‘Dopuszczalność  i  konsekwencje 
zastrzeżenia klauzuli merger’ 2013 (1) Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego 109.  
33 Łolik (n 9) 58.  
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be  given  a  particular  title  or  to  be  structured  in  any  particular  way35. 
Whether the parties intend to modify a contract subsequently entered into is 
a question of interpretation.  In any case, to establish such intention it is 
sufficient  that  the  agreement  determines  which  contract  is  about  to  be 
modified and what the content of the modification is36. In other words, for 
an agreement to be held to modify a contract  previously concluded, it must 
render the contract materially different from the one initially concluded. The 
difference could  consist in either establishing some additional rights and 
obligations  which  were  not  expressed  in  the  original  contract,  or  in 
extinguishing rights the parties originally enjoyed under the contract. The 
latter effect can be achieved by using a merger clause37.  
  Summarising this part of the paper, I find merger clauses far more 
significant than they are commonly thought of. They should be perceived as 
an  issue  of substantive  law,  as  they  modify  the  legal  relationship  and 
extinguish rights and obligations resulting from agreements made (including 
implicitly) before the contract document was signed. Conversely, they do 
not influence the process of applying evidentiary law. They do not raise any 
kind of presumption which could be rebutted. Where p arties have used a 
merger clause, there is no point proving any precedent agreements because, 
extinguished by virtue of the merger clause, they are no longer binding upon 
the parties. This conclusion, however, is  conditioned upon two following 
assumptions.  First, it is indispensable that the agreements made by the 
parties before the signing of the contract document containing the merger 
clause constitutes a valid contract. From this  it follows, inter alia, that the 
intention to create a legal relationship must exist38. Where there is no such 
intention, the contract is deemed to be concluded at the moment of signing 
the written document and, if so, the  issue in question does not arise at all. 
The preliminary agreements are not to be considered part of the cont ract. 
They only constitute the context of the contract which may be used within 
the framework of its interpretation. The second assumption is that the 
precedent agreement and the contract embodied in the written document 
containing the merger clause  address the same subject matter. Both  of the 
contracts must concern the same legal relationship in the sense that the first 
(i.e. orally made) gives rise to it, and the second (embodied in the document 
in question) modifies it. If the contracts do not have the same subject matter, 
there is a serious doubt whether a merger clause put into the second contract 
may render the first one  non-binding upon the parties. It  would seem to 
depend on the language used in a given merger clause.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See Machnikowski (n 12) 148.   
36 Piotr Machnikowski, ‘Treść umowy’ in Ewa Łętowska (ed), System prawa prywatnego. 
Tom 5. Prawo zobowiązań-część ogólna (C.H. Beck 2006) 461; Machnikowski (n 12) 
148.     
37 Strugała (n 8) 251 – 162.  
38 Followed by the offer and acceptance or presumed pursuant to art 72 (1) of the Polish 
Civil Code.   
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IV. MERGER CLAUSES VERSUS PRE-CONTRACTUAL STATEMENTS  
 
  Apart  from  their  influence  on  the  process  of  interpretation  and 
determination of the terms of a contract, merger clauses are purported to 
have  other  legal  effects  which  deserve  attention. They  are  considered  to 
mitigate  the  binding  effect  of  pre-contractual  statements39.  It  must  be 
stressed that in Polish legal scholarship the term ‘pre-contractual statements’ 
is  very ambiguous, and  may be misleading. The problem  of  the relation 
between pre-contractual statements and merger clauses arises when these 
statements are understood in the meaning of Art II. - 9:102 DCFR. Pursuant 
to the provision in comment, certain statements made before a contract is 
concluded may become part of the contract even though not expressed as 
terms  of the  contract,  if they set  reasonable expectations of the party to 
whom  the  statements  are  made40.  Notwithstanding  the  prospect  of  the 
binding nature that such a general provision may have in the future (see Art. 
69 of the CESL), it is important to  note that its ratio legis is similar to that 
underlying  Art.  2(2)  of  the  Consumer  Sales  Directive  of  May  1999 
(Directive  99/44/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council)41. 
Thus, the legal concept of certain pre-contractual statements becoming part 
of  a  contract  is known in Poland as a result of  implementation of EU 
Directives. Good examples of this concept are Art. 12 (2) of the Act of 27 
July  2002  on  specific  terms  and  conditions  of  consumer  sale  and 
amendments to the Civil Code, and Art. 4(2) & 4(3) of the Act of 29 August 
1997 on tourist services. In the legal literature many ways of explaining the 
meaning of these provisions have been presented, but none of the them seem 
to  be  shared  without  reservation. As far as  I am  concerned,  the most 
plausible explanation appears to be the one according to which statements 
made before the conclusion of  a  contract become part of the contract 42. 
However, the binding effect of pre-contractual statements is excluded where 
the decision of the parties addressed by the statement t o conclude the 
contract was not influenced by the statement or, generally speaking, the 
statement has not set reasonable expectations in the given circumstances43. 
  Given the protective purpose of the provisions in question, it is 
beyond any doubt that they   are mandatory rules 44. The parties may not 
derogate from them. From what  has been  established above it follows, 
however, that this conclusion does not mean that merger clauses never exert 
influence on the binding force of pre-contractual statements. They may still 
count  as  evidence  of  what  kind s  of  expectations  could  be  deemed 
                                                 
39 Zoll (n 11) 62.   
40 See for more details von Bar, Clive (21) 583.  
41 von Bar, Clive (21) 584.   
42  Przemysław  Mikłaszewicz,  Obowiązki  informacyjne  w  umowach  z  udziałem 
konsumentów na tle prawa Unii Europejskiej (Wolters Kluwer business 2008) 306; Piotr 
Machnikowski,  Prawne  instrumenty  ochrony  zaufania  przy  zawieraniu  umowy 
(Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2010) 128; Fryderyk Zoll, ‘Wykonywanie 
i skutki niewykonania lub nienależytego wykonania zobowiązań’ in Adam Olejniczak 
(ed), System prawa prywatnego. Prawo zobowiązań – część ogólna. Suplement (C.H. 
Beck 2010) 17-18; Włodarska-Dziurzyńska (n 17) 116.  
43 See Włodarska-Dziurzyńska (17) 17; Mikłaszewicz (42) 307.   
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reasonable45.  
 
 
V. MERGER CLAUSES VERSUS FILLING GAPS  
 
  The next question to be asked is whether merger clauses may affect 
the  application  of  Art.  56  of  the  Polish  Civil  Code46. Pursuant to this 
provision,  a  contract has not only the juridical effects agreed on by the 
parties,  but  also  those  which  result  from  the  law,  the  principles  of 
community life47  and custom.  This  provision  referes to  the concept of 
complete and incomplete contracts. Whereas the former fully specifies the 
rights  and  duties  of  the  parties  to  the  contract  for  all  possible  future 
circumstances, the latter contains gaps. Since real contracts are incomplete, 
the purpose of the sources of the terms of contract set out in Art. 56 is to fill 
in the gaps. The legal consequences deriving from law, the principles of 
community life and custom come into play every time there is a gap in  a 
contract, irrespective of whether the parties are aware of this effect 48. It is a 
commonly-held opinion among Polish scholars that these sources have  a 
certain order which is reflected in the language of  Art. 56: rules of law are 
first to complement the contract, but when there is no applicable rule of law, 
the principles of community life  and/or custom provide a solution 49. The 
implication of the given order would seem to be  that, within the scope of 
application of the rules of law, principles of community life and custom that 
may exist are irrelevant50. In other words, if the same matters are covered by 
both rules of law and existing principles of community life or custom, only 
the former source can complement the provisions of the contract. This calls 
for the conclusion that the parties cannot exclude the application of the rules 
of law, rendering  the principles of community life or custom applicable 
instead. They may, of course, expressly agree on legal consequences that are 
analogous to those stemming from custom or the principles of community 
life, but where the parties exclude the application of rules of law and do not 
provide any legal consequences themselves, the contract remains silent (has 
gaps).  
  As to  statutory  provisions  (law) ,  it  is  necessary  to  draw  a  line 
between mandatory (semi-mandatory) rules and default rules. Insofar as the 
first type of rules is concerned, it is clear that the parties to a contract cannot 
exclude their application by any kind of contractual clauses. This is true not 
only for the merger clauses analysed in this paper, but also for clauses which 
                                                 
45 Strugała (n 8) 269 - 273; Gorzko, Gumularz (n 32) 299; Pecyna (n 30) 42 –426.  
46 Again, like in the case of the art 65, the range of application of the provision is wider, as 
it concerns not only contracts, but also juridical acts.  
47 The concept of the principles of community life (morals) might be seen as the counterpart 
of the good faith and fair dealing concept. See Piotr Machnikowski, Justyna Balcarczyk, 
Monika Drela, Contract law in Poland (Wolters Kluwer 2011) 40-41.       
48  Marek  Safjan,  ‘Refleksje  o  roli  zwyczaju’  in  Nowińska  (ed)  Prawo  Prywatne  czasu 
przemian.  Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesorowi Stanisławowi Sołtysińskiemu 
(2005) 102; Machnikowski (n 13) 133; Janiak (n 20) 301. 
49  E  Łętowska,  ‘Wprowadzenie  do  części  ogólnej  zobowiązań’  in  Ewa  Łętowska  (ed), 
System prawa prywatnego. Tom 5. Prawo zobowiązań – część ogólna (C.H. Beck 2006) 
22-23; Machnikowski (n 13) 133. 
50  See  Zbigniew  Radwański,  Maciej  Zieliński,  ‘Normy  i  przepisy  prawa  cywilnego’  in 
Marek Safjan (ed) System prawa prywatnego. Tom 1. Prawo cywilne – część ogólna 
(C.H. Beck 2007) 338; See also Strugała (n 8) 267.   
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purport to exclude statutory provisions more deliberately. The same answer 
should be given to the question of whether a merger clause may preclude the 
court  from  filling  contractual  gaps  by  applying  custom  or  principles  of 
community life. While to  the best of my knowledge there is no extensive 
Polish legal literature examining this problem, it seems self-evident to me 
that the parties to a contract may exclude the application of neither custom 
nor the principles of community life51.     
  When it comes to default rules, it is clear from their very nature that 
parties are free to exclude their application as well as derogate from or 
amend their effects. In the Polish civil law, it is  deemed possible that the 
parties exclude the default rule by providing a different rule or by sta ting 
that it is not to be applied , without providing any contractual rule instead. 
Bearing this in mind, prima facie a merger clause seems to be a statement 
aimed at excluding all default rules applicable to the contract it is found in. 
Yet when considering it in more detail, a stricter interpretation of merger 
clauses seems to be preferable52. To clarify this standpoint, a closer look 
must be taken at the complementary role of default rules. As was said above, 
contracts (declarations of will) express norms  prescribing or forbidding a 
course of conduct. A complete norm contains certain fixed elements, such as 
the conditions of its application (i.e. the circumstances under which a norm 
is to be applied), the subject (i.e. the person or entity to whom a norm is  
addressed) and the object of a norm (i.e. the actions that a norm prescribes). 
When analysing default rules  in the Polish civil law, one can notice that 
some of  them  complete a norm when it is  only partially  expressed in  a 
contract (when it does not express all the elements of the norm). This is true 
in the case of Art. 455 of the Polish Civil Code, according to which if the 
time at which an obligation is to be performed has not been agreed on and 
cannot be determined from the nature of the obligation, the obligation shall 
be performed without undue delay upon the debtor being called on to do so. 
Without this provision, a contractual norm imposing an obligation would be 
incomplete, because it would be impossible to say when the obligation 
should be performed. As was highlighted above, the gap could not be filled 
in by the principles of community life , nor by custom. If  a merger clause 
could exclude the application of a respective default rule, it would result in 
the invalidity of the contract (as a whole) or in its partial invalidity because 
of  insufficiency  of  the  contract.  Thus,   it  turns  out  that  the  broad 
interpretation of merger clauses as excluding the application of any kind of 
default  rules  can  not  be  accepted. The  benigna  interpretatio  (or  favor 
contractus) principle apparently speaks against this broad interpretation of 
merger clauses. According to this principle, commonly accepted in Polish 
legal scholarship and jurisprudence, when interpreting contracts (juridical 
acts),  an interpretation  allowing the contract to remain  effective is to  be 
preferred to other possible interpretations which would render it void.  
  In  some  other  cases,  however,  default  rules  have  a  somewhat 
different function: they either impose additional obligations not expressed 
by the parties or modify the obligations expressed in the contract (modify 
                                                 
51 See Pecyna (n 30) 467; M. Łolik (n 29) 68; Strugała (n 8) 267 – 269.  
52 See Strugała (n 8) 269.  2013]  MERGER CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS GOVERNED BY 
POLISH LAW 
26 
 
norms expressed in it), but do not complete norms that would be otherwise 
incomplete. For example, according to Art. 370 of the Polish Civil Code, the 
liability of two or more debtors to perform an obligation concerning their 
common  property  is  solidary  unless  agreed  otherwise.  When  read  in 
conjunction  with Art.  369  (an  obligation  is  solidary  if  this  results  from 
statute or has been provided for), Art. 370 appears to modify the obligation 
of the parties so that it is solidary. If the application of Art. 370 is excluded, 
it  does  not  render  a  contract  concerning  the  common  property  of  two 
debtors void. It would only imply that their obligation is not solidary (it is 
divided).  It  is  plausible  that a  merger clause put  into a contract  may  be 
interpreted  as  excluding  the  application  of  default  rules  having  the 
aforementioned effect of modifying obligations expressed in the contract.   
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
   
  As we have seen, merger clauses inserted into a contract document 
may effectively limit the sources of the parties' rights and obligations to the 
content of the contract  document. This is mostly  because the parties are 
empowered to determine their own legal situation on the basis of freedom of 
contract (see sections III and V above). The findings given above show that 
merger  clauses  may  also  influence  the  process  of  contract  interpretation 
even though the rules of interpretation cannot be overruled by contract. The 
same is true for legislative provisions which automatically render some pre-
contractual statements part of the contract. These provisions, although said 
to be mandatory, may also be excluded by merger clauses. In both cases this 
is because merger clauses can be viewed as evidence of relevant facts. As 
far as subjective interpretation is concerned, they may be deemed evidence 
of the common intention of the parties to understand the contract within the 
four corners of the document. Whereas in the case of objective interpretation 
or of pre-contractual statements, merger clauses make it easier to prove that 
there  are  no  reasonable  expectations  as  to  extrinsic  circumstances 
(statements or undertakings) becoming part of the contract or  serving as 
means of its interpretation. The idea of judging the psychological state of 
people (their intentions) by the way they act (by what they do or say) is 
widely recognised in Polish legal theory. It is clear that the use of merger 
clauses as evidence of parties' intentions or expectations is convincing as 
long as they are provided by them or at least familiar to them. In the Polish 
law,  however,  there  is  no  need  to  provide  proof  of  such,  since  certain 
presumptions provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (Art. 244 and 245) 
make this proof redundant. In short, what follows from these presumptions 
is that persons who sign a document are aware of the whole content of the 
document, be it declarations of will or other statements and utterances.       
  At this point an explanation may be provided for why the effects of 
merger  clauses  inserted  into  standard  terms  of  contract  require  separate 
consideration. An essential aspect of standard terms of contract is that they 
are formulated in advance for an indefinite number of future transactions, 
and  as  such  they  are  not  individually  negotiated  by  the  parties. 
Notwithstanding this feature, they may appear in different forms, being a 
part  of  the  contract  document  or  a  separate  document.  Usually  they  are 
separate documents which are not signed by the parties to a contract. In this  
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case, they are not covered by the presumptions set out in Art. 244 and 245 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. From this  it follows that in most cases their 
evidentiary  function  is  negligible,  as  in  order  to  consider  them  to  be 
convincing evidence, it would be necessary to prove that the parties were 
aware of their presence in the standard terms of contract. To conclude this 
point, it is very important to  emphasise that the mere observance of the 
conditions  of  the  incorporation  of  standard  terms  of  con tract  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  clauses  contained  in  the  standard  terms  may 
constitute plausible evidence. The binding effect of contractual clauses as 
normative ones and the evidentiary importance of contractual clauses are 
two different things. In the Polish civil law it is possible, at least in some 
cases, for standard terms to be incorporated into a contract (become a part of 
it) only if  they are made easily accessible to the other party 53. It is quite 
obvious that  no conclusion may be drawn  from the fact that the standard 
terms were made accessible as to whether they were read in detail. In my 
view, it is also doubtful whether merger clauses put into standard terms of 
contract may influence the parties' prior agreements, i.e. have  the  effect 
described in section III of this paper. As explained in that section, the effect 
in question can be achieved because the merger clause is considered to be a 
subsequent contract to modify the prior contract. However, to conclude this 
or any other contract, the agreement of the parties is necessary. Again, the 
mere incorporation of standard terms does not amount in any case to the 
agreement of the parties. Standard terms can be incorporated into a contract 
to complement it when it is validly concluded between th e parties,  and 
cannot replace the agreement of the parties 54. Thus, as a result of merger 
clauses constituting an independent contract (modification contract), they 
cannot bring about the effect described in section III when not agreed on by 
the parties. 
  As said above, in conclusion a juxtaposition should be made between 
the effects of merger clauses under Polish and European private law. The 
effects of merger clauses under Polish law seem to most resemble  those set 
out in the DCFR, as they ascribe  lesser importance to clauses contained in 
the standard terms  of  contract  than to  those  inserted into  the contract 
document (see Art. II.–4:104 (2) DCFR). Unlike under Polish law, none of 
the European private law model rules preclude the parties’ prior statements 
from  being  used  to  interpret  a  contract  containing  a  merger  clause. 
Notwithstanding this  difference, merger clauses' effects  under Polish  and 
European private law do not differ as significantly as is sometimes said in 
the literature. Whether this should be assessed positively must be left for 
further studies on merger clauses' effects under European private law and 
the consideration of the reader.         
                                                 
53 See Krzysztof Zagrobelny in Edward Gniewek (ed), Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz (C.H. 
Beck 2006) 583-588.    
54 Fryderyk  Zoll,  ‘Natura prawna  wzorców  umownych’ (1998) Państwo  i Prawo 5, 57; 
Małgorzata Bednarek, Wzorce umów w prawie polskim (C.H. Beck 2005) 170; Maciej 
Skory, Klauzule abuzywne w polskim prawie ochrony konsumenta (Zakamycze 2005) 
144; Radwański (n 12) 93.     